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ABSTRACT
Thispaper uses the American Association of University Professors
surveys for the period 1965 to 1976 to examine the effect of faculty unionism
on faculty pay. It compares estimated effects of unionismon compensation
from cross—section regressions of facultypay on union organization and
froma longitudinal model designed to correct cross—sectionestimates
for "unobserved characteristics" of schools thatare correlated with unionism.
The major findings are that: 1. unionism raisesfaculty pay but that the
extent of the effect varies greatly by estimating model and timeperiod
covered; 2.the years a school has been organized has astronger effect on
pay than the standard 0—1 union duny variable; 3. unionism raises the
fringe benefit share of compensation; 4. the estimated coefficienton
faculty unionism in cross—sectionregressions overstates the union impact






(617) 868—3915In 1964 virtually no
college or university faculty in theUnited States
was represented by a trade union. In1977 over 300 institutionswere organized,
corstituting over 10 percent of Institutions
of higher education.1Faculty unions
were among the most rapidlygrowing in the economy, scoringconsiderably better
than the average in winning representation.2
How have faculty unions
affected the economic position of
academics? Which components of thecompen-
sation structure have beenmost influenced by unionism? Have theeconomic
effects of unionism changed over timeas the academic market place has
deteriorated?
This paper examines these and relatedquestions regarding the effects of
facultyunionism on compensation with detailedlongitudinal data files from
the American Association of UniversityProfessors (AAUP). In contrast topre-
vious work on the economiceffects of faculty unionism, which have been
limited to smallsamplesand obtained inconclusive oftencontradictory results
(Birnbauni, Morgan—Kearney, Brown—Stone)3, thisstudy expoits the full set of
AAUP compensation data to estimate unioneffects on longitudinal as well as
cross—section data. The paper finds a substantialunion effect which, however,
differs over time andamong institutions, and whose magnitude varies with the
model used in the estimation procedure. In
cross—section calculations, faculty
unionism has a significant effect oncompensation which differs among institu-
tions, rank of faculty, and over time; and whichis more pronounced on fringe
benefits than on straight—time
pay. In a longitudinal model, which takes
account of the possible selectivity bias inInstitutions that
organize and of the effect of school characteristicson the growth of
compensation, estimates of the magnitude of the union compensation effectvary
from small to fairly sizeabic, dcpcning on the beforeunion compensation
used to control for the omitted factor.In both the cross—section and longi-
tudinal analyses, institutions that have been organized forlonger periods of2
time appear to have been more affected by unions than those organized more recently.
Section one of the paper sketches briefly the institutional background
of faculty unionism. Section two describes the data set under study and the
econometric methodology used to estimate union effec-. Section three examines
the characteristics of schools that become organized. Section four presents
estimates of the effect of academic unions on compensation and fringes. The
paper concludes with a brief summary of the empirical results.
I. Faculty Unionism in the U.S.
Beginning in the late 1960's academic faculty in the U.S. moved from
essentially complete nonunion status to moderate levels of organization.
In 1966, just 5,200 faculty were represented by unions; in 1970, 47,300 were
represented by unions; in 1977 133,000 faculty were on organized campuses
(Burton, table 7, p. 34).
The burst of organization was aided by several institutional developments:
the passage of state laws making organization of public workers, including
faculty at public colleges and universities, easier than in the past; changed
attitudes toward unionization by faculty; the extension of NLRB election proce-
dures to the university sector in 1969; and the general growth of unions of
public employees.
With respect to the first development, in the 1960's and 1970's a large
number of states enacted laws which either directly or indirectly made organi-
zation of faculties in the public sector easier. Some states enacted laws
relating to the right of public employees in postsecondary educational
institutions to form unions and bargain collectively. Others passed
omnibus public employee bills which include employees of state colleges and
universities. Still others have de facto recognized the right of faculties to
organize and have considered legislation to legalize the de facto situation,
while yet others have treated the possibility of organization less favorably.3
The Education Commission of the States hascategorized collective negotiations
legislation along several dimensions, according to whetherstates have
specific laws relating to postsecondary education andaccording to the
nature of public employee legislation. From theCommission's classifications,
five types of states can be distinguished:4
Group 1 —Stateswhich have specific legislation which deals with
public employees in postsecondary educational institutions.
Group 2 —Statesin which there is no specificmention of post—
secondary education in an omnibus publicemployee bill
but where by implication orinterpretation postsecondary
personnel and flstitutjons are included.
Group 3 —Stateswhich have no collective negotiations legislation
for postsecondary education but in which thereare de facto
postsecondary contracts or employee unit recognition and
in which some legislative activity inrespect to legalization
of the de facto situation has taken place since 1970.
Group 4 —Statesin which there has beenno notable legislation
pendingon the subject of collectivebargaining for public employeesin Postsecondary educationor where there was
legislativeactivity since 1970 of an omnibus legislation levelin which pOstsecondarypersonnel would have been
includedbut where no legislation has beenpassed.
Group 5 —Stateswhich by statute prohibitany form of collective
negotiations by public employees.
Whilenot without problems, the Commissionclassification provides a
rough grouping of the favorableness ofstate laws toward organization. Those
with explicit collectivebargaining laws have an institutionalframework for
recognition and negotiations, which shouldencourage unionization, while those
without laws make recognitionand bargaining an uncertain andriskier process.
Thestates which outlaw publicemployee negotiations can be expectedto have
the least favorable environment forunionization.
With respect to attitudes, severalsurveys of the views of facultyin
thelate l960's and early l970'sreveal surprising support toward unionson
campus. In the 1969 American Councilon Educationsurveyof faculty, 59 percent4
thought that there was a place on campus for faculty collective bargaining
and 47 percent agreed that "faculty strikes can be legitimate action."In a
1972 survey, 43 percent of faculty agreed that "the recendgrowth of union-
ization of college and university faculty is beneficial and shouldbe extended,"
[Ladd & Lipset, pp. 252—253]. While we lacksurvey evidence on attitudes in
earlier years and have not investigated the potentialcauses of attitudinal
changes, it is highly unlikely that faculty were as favorably inc]Jned to orga-
nization in previous decades.
The extension of NLRB elections to private colleges and universities in
1969 eased the task of organizing those institutions. From 1969 to 1977,
colleges and universities held 127 representation elections of which 61percent
were won by the union.
Finally, and more speculatively, the growth of public sector organization
in general may also be a potential cause of the growth of faculty unionism in
the public sector. On the one hand, as increasing numbers of public employees
become organized, the acceptability of organization rises. On the other, facul-
ties may feel the need for a union to bargain for their interests against those
of other public employees
Bargainers and Bargaining
There are three main faculty unions: the American Federation of Teachers
(AFT), which had 101 organized schools in 1977; the National Education -
Association(NEA) with 132 schools; and the American Association of University
Professors (AAUP), which like other professional organizations threatened with
unionization, responded by conducting representation elections and signing
collective agreements; in 1977, the AAUP represented faculty in 41 schools and
shared representation with the NEA on 4 (National Center of Education Statistics,
table 4.166, p. 196). The NEA and AFT tend to be concentrated among two year
co1legs while the AAUP is found largely in four year institutions.5
On the employer side, most organizedfaculties are public iflStItutjons.
In the sample covered in thispaper, for example, 34.4 percent of public
institutions were organized in 1976—77compared to 16.7 percent of all
institutions.
6
Faculty unions that negotiate with publicinstitutions face the problem,
endemic to the public sector, thatbudget decisions are made by legislators
rather than by the administrators whomthey face across the bargaining table.
Because final funding authorityrests with legislatures, academicmanagers may be
willing to agree on certain increases, with theknowledge that if budgets are
not raised, the contracts will not beeffective. In Massachusetts, Worcester
State College and Massachusetts
College of Art negotiated contracts with the
AFT in sunmer 1975 which provided forwage increases but because of legislative
and executive decisions, no actionwas taken and the increase was notgranted.
The ability of unions to extractgains may depend on their influenceon the
legislature, rather than on negotiationswith academic administrators.
Collective bargaining in academia hassimilarities and differences with
bargaining in other sectors. In terms oftopics, faculty unions evince considerable
concern for job security and tenureprovisions, much like other unions.
Faculty unions have also sought additional
fringe benefits, with the result
that many two year and newerInstitutions have obtained fringesformerly exclusive
to older, senior institutes [Duryea,
Fisk, and Associates, p. 96}. Most
faculty contracts contain grievance clauses
[ibid., pp. 66—86], of a fairly
standard type. In several negotiations
unions have expressed concern forpay
inequities, seeking greater standardizationof rates ——acommon union goal.
The 1973 AAUP —Adei.phj.University contract established an "Inequity Fund"
designed to reduce differentials
among faculty..7 On the other hand, unlike
nearly all American unions, which eschewa union role in operating establishments,6
academic unions are typically greatly concerned with governance, seeking to
enhance the role of faculty in academic decision—making. In addition, faculty
unions have rarely invoked the prime weapon of conflict of labor, the, strike,
with a result that bargaining often stretches over long periods of time.
Whether the institutional and market structure in academe is likely to
create the possibility of large or small union—induced increases in earnings
is not clear. Public sector bargaining problems, and lack of a significant
strike threat, may make faculty unions relatively weak.
II. Data and Methodology
This study examines the effect offaculty unions on academic pay using
data on average compensationby institution from the annualcompensation surveys
of the AAUP. The AAUP data are obtainedfrom an annual questionnaire distributed
to academic Institutions every year:
the questionnaire requests detailed infor-
mation on pay by rank for each school. Thesample covered has increased over
time: in 1964—65 the AAUPsurvey contained 755 schools; in 1977—78, thesurvey
included 2652 IflStitutjons. The AAUP datafiles used for the annualreports on
the Economic Status of the Professionfrom 1970 to 1976provide the basic compensation
figures for this study. Relatively few facultieswere organized in 1970 compared
to 1976, giving valuable before/after unionizationcomparisons. In addition, a
special file was created from the questionnaires of1965 to provide figures for
the period prior to the advent ofany substantial unionization. The files for
1970—76 and 1965 were grouped intoa single time series of cross—sections, with
longitudinal information on a large number ofinstitutions in different years.
The size of the sample variesover time due to differences in responses. While
the data set does not cover the entireuniverse of academic institutions, it
8 offers a large and reasonablyrepresentative sample of colleges and universities.
The data tapes contain threemeasures of compensation which will be used
in the empirical work:salaries; total compensation definedas salaries plus7
fringe benefits; arid fringe benefits. Whenfringes are the dependent variable,
total compensation is included asan explanatory variable in order to isolate
the impact of unionism on thecomposition of the compensation package. In
addition, they contain information on thedegree granting status of schools:
whether they grant Ph.D.'s,masters, bachelors, or two year degrees.
Information on whether or not acampus is covered by collective bargaining
was obtained from the Directory ofBargaining Agents and Contracts in Higher
Education (1 April 1977) of the NationalCenter for the Study of Collective
Bargaining in Higher Education which providesa hicomplete?1 count of trade union
organization of academic enterprises. The'year an institution was first listed
as unionized was added to the tapeas the appropriate indicator of unionization.
Additional data on the characteristics ofschools was obtained from a
computer tape originally put together by G.Jackson of Stanford University.
This tape includes information
on SAT scores, family income of
students, enrollments, and related factors whichmight affect compensation
oetting.
The sources of the data arc described indetail in the notes to Table 1.
Estimating the Union Effect
There are two basicways in which the AAUP data set can be used to
estimate the impact of trade unionism onfaculty compensation: through
cross—section regressions of compensationon unionization;
or through more complex before/after models which exploit the longitudinal
natureof thedata to eliminate "unobserved" school factors.
Thecross—sectionmodel is represented by:
(1) lnW1 =aUN+ +
where =facultypay in the i'th institution in year t
=dummyvariable which takes the value 1 i.f the ith school±8
organized in year t
=vectorof control variables, assumed constant overtime,whoseeffect
is measured by the vector bt
C. =residual. it
Least square regressions will yield unbiased estimates of the union
coefficient a when E(E.t UNt) =0.When the residual is correlated with
unionization, however, say because organization is more likely in highwage
institutions, least squares will yield biased estimates. The availability
of longitudinal data provides a means of correcting for the bias, essentially
by permitting "before/after" comparisons of union compensation effects.
Formally, we model the potential correlation between
UNit and c.'ydividing
into two components: an omitted institution factorh. which is correlated
with UNit (and the controls Z) and acomponent independent of the variables
in the equation, This yields the following model:
(2) £nW. =aUN. +bZ+h..+v it t itti 1 it
If z. =Z.and if Z. and h. have the same effect on W. before unionismas it 1 1 1 it
afterwards, the comparable equation for the pre—union period is:
(3) 2.,nw10=bZ+h+v
where 0 relates to the period prior to unionization.
Subtracting (3) from (2) yields a simple before/after model
(4)LnW./w. aUN.+v.-V. it iO t it it iO
When the effect of the various control variables differsover time, a
more complex model is needed. If the effect of the omitted factor in
the first period is and if the effect in the second period is
h.0
and if h h ,theunobserved factor h. cannot: be eliminated by simple dif— it iO 1
ferencing. Letting h. =Aho,the model can be written (for two periods) as:
(5) LnW =bZ+h +v 10Oi iO iO9
(6) LnW. aUN. +v. itt ittiitit
whichbecomes:
(7) Ln W. =AmW.0 +aUN.+(b
—
Ab0)z.+ v. —Xv
Least squaresestimates of equation (7) do not yield consistent estimatesof
theunion effectbecause E(W v)0. One can obtain consistent estimates iO iO
by instrumenting W.0 on other variables, such aswages in another period. Alter-
natively, the extent of the bias on the union coefficientcan be estimated
using omitted variable bias formulae.
The principal independent variable in theanaisi3, tl'c union status
of schools, is measured in thispaper in two different ways: with an 0—1
dichotomous variable for whethera school is or is not organized in agiven
year; and with a more complex indicator of union
strength, the years a school
is organized. Whileyears organized is unlikely to be anappropriate measure
of union strength in industries
that have long been unionized, thenewness
of faculty unionism makes itapotentially valuable measure of organizational
strength. Years organized may be expectedto have a positive impact on
compensation for two reasons: because it takestime for faculties to obtain
signed contracts and translate organization
into wages and becaus institutions
where union wage gains aremore likely to be sizeablemay tend to be organized
earlier than those where unionismmight have smaller economic effects. In
empirical work, estimates are made of theeffects on compensation of an 0—1 union
dummy variable, of years organized, and ofthe two variables together.
III. Who Gets Unionized?
Before examining the effects of unionismon compensation, it is important
to consider the determinants of unionization and, inparticular, the extent to
which organization is or is not related to level ofcompensation prior to
unionization.10
Table 1 records estimates of the relationbetween characteristics of
institutions and union status in the AATJPsample as of 1976—77. Columns 1 to
3 give thecoefficients from a logistic curve thatestimates the impact of
the characteristics of institutions,including compensation in 1970 (column 1)
or 1965 (column 2) on organization:
(8) Pr(U) =1/(1+exp—
wherePr(U) =probabilityof unionization in 1976
X =explanatoryfactors
Columns 4 to 6 give regression
coefficients linking the number ofyears
organizedtothe 3ame set of ixdependentvar:;1cc. Four tvpeofindcpcndpt
variablesare used to explain the probability thata school is organized and
the years organized:(1) measures of the characteristics of theschool and its
studentbody; log enrollment, to measure the impact ofsize; log of dollars
per full—time enrollee, to measure wealth of theinstitution; the log of SAT
scores of students, to measure the quality of thestudent body; three variables
representing the position of the families of studentsin the income distribution,
the percentage with incomes less than$5,999, with incomes from $6,000 to $8,900
and with incomes from 9,00O to$11,999; and a series of dummy variables reflecting
whether the school is public (vs.private); whether it is a Ph.D.,
masters, or 2 year granting institution (vs.
a four year college); whether it is
a primarily black school, a co—edor female school or a religiousschool;
(2) measures of the region in whichthe school is located, tocapture the
different attitudes toward unionismin different parts of thecountry; (3)
measures of state legislation
regarding organization represented by dummy
variables for whether the state had
legislation regardingPost—secondary
educational institutions,an omnibus public employee bill, de factounion recognition,
or anti—union legislation (asdescribed in section one);(4) measures of
the log compensationprior to the advent of
extensive unionism in twoyears:
in 1965, when no lflStitutjonsin the sample wereorganized, and in 1970, when
relatively few were organized. The
coefficient on wages in anearly period will11
show whether or not unions have tended toorganize high wage institutions,
which would bias cross—section estimates of the unioncompensation effect upwards.
Because some schools were organized in 1970, theequations with 1970 compensation
as controls are estimated in two samples: the full sample ofschools, including
those who were union in 1970, which could yield biased estimatesof the
link from compensation to organization because of thesimultaneous effect of
unionism on wages; and a sample excluding institutionsalready organized in
1970, which eliminates this problem. The sample sizes in columns 1and 2
and in columns 4 and 5 differ because of the fewermatches between the 1965
and 1976 samples thanbetween the 1970 and 1976samples. The sample sizes
in columns 3 and 6 are smaller thanin columns 2 and 5 due odeletion
of schools organized in 1970.
The logistic and OLS estimates show thatcertain types of institutions
are more likely to be organized than others.Organization is more frequent
for: public than for private schools; fortwo year institutions relative to
institutions granting higher degrees; for schoolswith lower SAT scores among
students; and for institutions in the Northeast,especially relative to those
in the South.
The coefficients on the dummy variables forthe types of legislation
indicate that the favorabj.eness of state lawshas a substantive impact on
organization, with positive estimated effects for themore favorable laws
and a negative estimated effect for theleast favorable. Since the calcu—
lations include regional variables whichare correlated with the legislation
dummies, the result is a reasonably powerfulone. While several of the
legislative dummy variables have sizeable standarderrors, as a set they
enter the equations significantly.
Finally, in all of the calculations the baseyear wage variable is
positively correlated with organization, indicating thatunions have tended
to organize faculties that hadrelatively high initial pay. The coefficient
on the base period wage is considerablylarger in columns 2, 3 and 5 and 6


























Table 1: Logistic Curve and Least SauaresEstimates
of the Determinants of Faculty Unionismas of 1976—77
12
Explanatory Variables
Logistic Curve Estimates of the Effect
of Factors on Probability of LTnionism
(1) (2) (3)
Least Squares Estimates















































Specific Legislation •54(.54) •89(.46)
Omnibus Public .53(.58) l.04(.48)
Employee Bill
Defacto .22(.67) .37(.52) .18(.54)
of Bargaining
































































.141 .70 .76 .5412a
Notes to Table 1
'School characteristicsdata are defined as follows:
Degree granting status based on AAUP definition as follows:
Ph.D.—granting =CategoryI: Institution offers the doctorate degree
and conferred in the most recent threeyears an annual average of 15 or more
doctorates covering a minimum of three non—relateddisciplines.
Masters—granting =CategoryII: Institution awards degrees above
the baccalaureate but does not qualify forCategory I.
Two—year Institution =CategoryIII: Two—year institution with
academic ranks
The deleted group consists of Category IIB:Institution awards only
the baccalaureate or equivalent degree.
Public/private status from AAUP file.
The other school characteristics datawere supplied by Gregory Jackson of the
Stanford University School of Education and definedas follàws:
Enrollment (measured by full—time equivalentstudents) and expenditure
data for the 1970, 1971, and 1972 academicyears were compiled from the Higher
Education General Institutional Survey conductedannually between 1966 and
1974 by the U.S. Office of Education. Enrollmentdata for years preceding
and following this perios are notstrictly comparable. The expenditures
data used are under the category "Educational andGeneral Expenditures: Total."
The post—1970 expenditures were deflated to 1970dollars with the Consumer
Price Index. The mean amount of expendituresper full—time equivalent student
for the 1970 to 1972 period was used in thecomputations.
The average academic ability of each relevantcollege's undergraduates
was approximated by an estimate of theaverage combined verbal and math
Scholastic Aptitude Test of the school's 1971entering freshmen. These esimates
(which involved some imputations) are discussedat length in Astin and Henson.
2lncludes additionaldunmy for not in U.S. in years organized regression.
3Datarelating to the income distribution of the families ofundergraduate students obtained from G. Jackson's school characteristicstape. These data were collected
from the "Tripartite Application" (i.e.,"Institutional Application to Participate
in Federal Student Financial AidPrograms"), a standard form (#1035) of the U.S.
Office of Education. On the 1974application (from which the data were obtained)
each school was asked to estimate the numberof full—time and half—time under-
graduates from families in the following incomeranges: $O—5,999, $6,000—8,999,
$9,000—l1,999, and $12,000 and above. Full—time andhalf—time students were
combined for this study by multiplying the latterby .50 to obtain the total number
of full—time equivalent undergraduatestudents from families in each of the four
income classes.
Source: American Association ofUniversity Professors
G. Jackson
Education Commission of the States
National Center for the Study of CollectiveBargaining in Higher Education.1'
1965compensation is used as the control. The positive regression coefficients
on in compensation prior to unionization in the equations highlight the
need to control for initial compensation in analyzing the impact of faculty
unions on compensation.
IV.RegressionAnalysis of Union Compensation Effect
Estimatesof the effect of faculty unionism on in compensationare
presentedin thissectionusing the cross—section andlongitudinal models
describedearlier. The estimates suggest that faculty unionism raises
wages, with schools organized earlier evincing a larger union impact than
those with morerecent unionism.
Leastsquares estimates of the cross—section relation between faculty
unions and in of salaries or in of total compensation from 1970—1971 to
1976—1977 are given inTable 2. Columns1 and 2 of the table list the total number
ofinstitutions in each year's sample and the number of organized institutions.
Columns3and 4 give the coefficients and standarderrors of the union dummy variable
on in compensation and in salaries,, respectively. Columns 5—8 present com-
parableinformation for the effect of unions on the compensation of faculty
by rank. All of the regression calculations include the list of control
variables given at the bottom of the table. The calculations for total
faculty also include the percentage of faculty in various ranks, as specified
in the table note.
The regression results show a significant union impact, which is larger
on total compensation than on salaries and which is modestly larger for pro-
fessors than for those in lower ranks. The greater impact of unionism on corn—
pensation than on salaries reflects the fact that unionism appears to raise
fringesespecially significantly (a pattern to be explored further in Table 5),
possiblyasa result of the greater weight given in a union setting to senior
personnel who favor fringes. The larger impact of unionism on professorial
than other salaries may also reflect the role of older faculty in unionized
marLets cormared to competitive riarketc 'ierc wagc 'e rore resonsivc to
younger "marginal" employees.14
Table 2: Estimates of the Effect of Faculty
Unionism on Ln of Total Compensation and Ln ofSalaries,
/1
Annual Cross—Sections, 1970—1977 —
Coefficientsand Standard Errors
SampleSize,AllFacu1ty"- Faculty by onl CttaLiuj Yearfor All Facuity On in on ln Prof Assoc Assist Instructors
totalunion calaryCoinpensation
70—71 996 42 .10 .11 .10 .10 .09 .09
(.01) (.02) (.03) (.02)(.02) (.02)
71—72 926 74 .05 .07 .07 .06 .06 .05
(.01) (.01) (.02) (.01)(.02) (.01)
72—73 889 90 .04 .07 .08 .07 .05 .04
(.Cl) (.01) (.02) (.01)(.01) (.01)
73—74 886 96 .03 .06 .07 .06 .05 .04
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)(.01) (.01)
74—75 897 102 .06 .09 .08 .08 .07 .06
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)(.01) (.02)
75—76 867 108 .05 .07 .07 .07 .05 .05
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)(.01) (.01)
76—771221 195 .(4 .05 .05 .04 .04 .03
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)(.01) (.01)
/1
The controls include the followingvariables: School Characteristics:
(Log (Enrollment), Public, Ph.D.Granting, Masters Granting, Rank 2 Year,
Black, Female, Coed, Religious, Log (Dollarsper Full—Time Enrollee).
Log (SAT Scores), Percent of Studentswith Families in Specified Incocc ClassesandRegion (Northeast,South, West).
/2
Sample size is for all faculty ——slightvariation by type of faculty.
/3
Controlsinclude the percentage of faculty whowere professors, associate
professors, and assistant professors.
Source: See notesto table 1.15
Theestimated coefficients on unionism differ noticeably over time,drop-
ping fairly steadily from high levels of .11 (total) to .10 (professors) in
1970—71 to much lower levels of .05 (total and professors) by 1976—77. Because
the cross—section samples change over time, there are two possible explanations
for thispattern: a true time effect in which the impact of unionism is
weakenedin the declining market of the mid 1970's; or a "cohort effect" in
which union effects have been smaller on more recently organizedcampuses.
One way of differentiating between these two situations is to estimate
the coefficient of unionism on a fixed set of schools over an extended number
of periods. If there is a time (or "age") effect in which the union impact de-
clines over time, the coefficient on unionism in the same set of schools will
drop from the early years to 1977. If there is no such effect, the estimated
union impact will rain the same. Table 3 presents the results of such
calculations. It compares, for a fixedset of schools, the estimated cffcct
of unionism in each year from 1970—71to 1975—76 with the effect in 1976—77,
when, according to Table 2, the union impactwas the smallest. Column 1
records the size of the sample of schoolsreporting in each base year.
Columns2and 3 show the number unionized in the baseyear and in 1976—77. The
coefficientson unionism inthe base year and in 1976—77 are given incolumns
4 and5.In eachyear thecomparison shows a decline in the union impact,
ranging from .04 to .06 points. While thiscomparison controls for changes in
the overall sample, it does not controlfor the growth of organizationover
the period and the changing schools in the unionsample. To compare the effect
of unionism on the same schools the unionism variablewas decomposed into two
variables:a dummy variable for schools organized in the baseyear and a
separate dummy variable for those that became unionized thereafter. Column 6
gives the coefficient for the dummy variable for the schoolsorganized in the
base year. With the exception of 1970—71 thecoefficients in column 6 are























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































indicating that schools already organized in the baseyear had larger union
wage effects. In several cases the estimates on the dummy variable for the
newly organized schools is negative, indicating that, for whateverreason,
there is a definitive differential effect of unionismon schools depending
on when they were organized. While the estimated effect of unionismon the
same schools shows a decline in the impact of organization from eachbase
year to 1976—77, the drop is much attenuated from that found for all schools.
At least half of the estimated drop in the ovei'all union effectis due to the
smaller impact of unionism on schools that weremore recently organized
rather than to a drop in the effect of unionism ona fixed set of organized
institutions.
Years organized and compensation
The evidenca that the union wage effect in 1976—77 isgreater for
schools that were organized earlier than for thoseorganized later suggests
that the 0—1 union dummy variablemay not be the best measure of the
characteristics of organization that leads to higherwages. A potentially
better variable may be the length of timeorganized. Accordingly, the
regressions of Table 2 were re—estimated with the 0—1 dummy variable replaced
with years organized as the prime explanatory factor and with both thedummy
variable and years organized used as explanatory factors.
The results of these calculations are given in Table 4. Columns 1 and 2
record the mean years organized for all schools and for the unionized schools.
Column 3 gives the coefficient on years organized when it is the solemeasure
of unionism while columns 4 and 5 record the coefficientson years organized
and on the union dummy variable when both are included in theregressions.
From 1970—71 through 1972—73 both variables enter significantly,roughly
"dividing up" the union effect. Thereafter, the coefficient onyears organized18
Table 4: Estimates of the Effect
of the Length of Period Organized on in of Faculty Compensation'
Mean of Years Organized Coefficient and Standard
Coefficient Error on
All Unionized and Stan— Year Organ— Unionism
Institutions Institutions dard Error ized with with Year
Only Ofl Year Unionism Organized
Organized Included Included
1970—71 .07 1.66 .04 .02 .08
(.01) (.01) (.02)
1971—72 .05 .75 .05 - .03 .05
(.01) (.01) (.02)
1972—73 .13 1.28 .04 .02 .03
(.01) (.01) (.02)
1973—74 .21 1.94 .03 .02 .02
(.01) (.01) (.02)
1974—75 .33 2.90 .03 .03 .004
(.003) (.01) (.02)
1975—76 .45 3.61 .02 .02 —.004
(.003) (.005) (.02)
1976—77 .59 3.69 .02 .02 —.02
(.002) (.003) (.01)
/1
Allregressionsinclude controls listed in Table 2.
Sample sizes same as in Table 2.19
tends to be much more significant, while that on the union duimny variable drops
from .02 to an insignificant positive or to a negative value. In the later
period, the years organized variable dominates the calculations, implying
that newly organized schools obtained slight, if any, unionwage gains in
the mid 1970s. According to the regression coefficients for 1976—77,
a school that was organized for only one year had no union wage effect
whereas one organized for, say 5 years, would obtain a .08 gain. While it would
be wrong to extrapolate the log—linear form beyond the period under study,
as the effect of years organized is likely to level off as the variable increases,
the results suggest much larger effects for schools that have been organized
longer, with little or no union impact for those organized in recent years.
Whether the observed pattern represents the effect of period of organization,
the weakened market at the time of organization in the.1970's, or the unmeasured
characteristics of schools that lead to small or negligible union gains,
cannot be determined from the data, requiring additional years of observation.
Fringes
The larger effect of faculty unionism on total academic compensation than
on salaries suggests the value of a more detailed look at the area ofpay where
unions appear to make the biggest impact, fringes. In academe the mostimpor-
tant fringes are insurance and pensions,with the university contribution to TIAA—
CREFF often constituting a sizeable fraction of facultypay. Faculty unions have
tended to press for increased institutional contributions to theseprograms and
to many other fringes as well.
The impact of faculty unionism on fringes is examined in Table 5, which
records the results of regressing dollars of fringes on dollars ofstraight—
time—pay, unionism, and the control variables used in preceding tables. By
controlling for salary, the regressions estimate the effect of unions on the
composition of the compensation package. Salary rather than total compensation
is used as the independent variable because of the simultaneity problem due to20
the fact that fringes are includedas part of compensation. Formally, the
"structural" parameter for thcimpact of unioni on fringes,conncncatjor
held fed, can be derived fromthe regression using asimple sirmiltaneous ecuaticn
model. Let Ssalary, F =fringes,C =compensation(S +F).Then, the
impactofunionization on fringes, totalcompensation held fixed, is:
(9) FaU + bC =aU+ b(F +S)so that F =(a/i-b)U+(b/l-b)S
Hence we can obtain the parameter
a by dividing the coefficient on Uby 1 minus
the coefficient on S.
The calculations reveal a significantimpact of unionism on fringesexcept
in 1970—71. As in the
compensation and salary calculations, theimpact of union-
ism does, hos.iever, changeover time, It drops from 25—30percent from 1971—75 to
10 percent in 1976—77. Estimates (notreported in the table) of the union effect
on a fixed sample of schools showthat, as with totalcompensation much
of the drop is due tochanges in the Schools that
are organized rather
than to declines in theeffect of unionism on thesame school over time.
.gitudinai Model
Thelongitudinal model developed inSection I uses wages priorto unioni-.
zation to control for omitted
factors that may be correlatedwith unionism and
with later wages, biasing
cross—section estimates of the unioncompensation
effect. Table 6
presents least squares estimates ofthe longitudinal model
with in of compensation in1970 and in ofcompensation in 1965 as indicators
for the omitted factors.
The least squares calculationsignore the problem
noted earlier of thecorrelation between the residualand the initial period's
level of pay. Experimentswith instrumentalvariables, in which the lagged
compensation was instrumented
on in compensation in otheryears, gave suff i—
ciently similar results tosuggest that the OLS calculationssuffice to cap-
ture the effect of unionismin the data. Eachregression in the table con—21
Table 5: Estimates of the Effect of Faculty Unionism
on Dollars of Fringe Benefits for All Faculty
with Dollars of Straight—Time Pay Held Fixed'
Coefficient Elasticity
Mean (Standard Error) Structural of Union
Fringe on Unionism Parameters Effect
(1) (2) (3) (3)1(1)
1970—71 $1,252 19(78) 21 .02
1971—72 1,419 296(69) 333 .23
1972—73 1,618 357(71) 396 .25
1973—74 1,818 401(71) 449 .25
1974—75 1,959 534(73) 571 .29
1975—76 2,133 358(72) 415 .19
1976—77 2,238 206(66) 243 .11
/1
Sample sizes same as in Table 2; all regressions include same controls
as in Table 2, including percentage of faculty for various ranks.22
tains the full set of controls used in Table 2but is limited to the sample
of institutions reporting in the baseyear 1970 or 1965 as well as in the
specified year. Because of this restriction thesample sizes are smaller
than in Table 2.
Lines 2—5 deal with the sample of institutionsreporting in 1970
as well as in the later year. The first
line gives the coefficient and
standard error on the 0—1 uniondutrny variable in the absence of liicom-
pensation in 1970. The second line recordsthe coefficient on unionism and
on the ln of 1970 compensation obtained
by addition of the latter variable
to the regressions. Given thepositive link between unionization and1970
compensation obtained in Table 1, addition ofthe compensation variable
should reduce the estimated effectof unionism. This isclearly the case,
with a sizeable drop in theestimated impact of unions of .03 to.05 points.
The coefficients in line 2 aregenerally small and in several cases insig-
nificant, implying that much of thecross—section relation between the 0—1
dummy variable and compensation j the resultof the organization of insti-
tutions that were already highpaying in 1970 rather than the effect ofor-
ganization on tompensation. A much lessdrastic chance in the estimatedeffect
of unionism is obtained in lines4—5, which record the results of rresfn in
compensation on years organized with and without lncompensation in 1970 as a
control. While addition of 1970compensation substantially reduces the impact of
unionism (by 1/3rd to 3/4ths),years organized still obtains a significant
positive coefficient in all but oneyear (1973—74). With the apparently
better specification of the unionvariable, the positive correlation between
base year pay and organization doesnot reduce the impact of unionism to
the marginal levels given in line3.
Lines 7—9 record the results ofanalogous experiments using ln com-
pensation in 1965 as the control variable.The results are strikingly dif-
ferent. When 1965pay is the proxy for the omitted factor, the coefficient23
Table 6:Estimates of the Effect of Unionization on
in of Faculty Compensation, Controlling for Compensation





and in Later Years
1. Number of 805 764 749 744 720 858
Institutions
2. Coefficient and .07 .07 .05 .08 .06 .04
Standard Error (.02) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01)
on Unionism in
Basic Regression
3. Coefficient and .02 .02 .01 .05 .02 .00
Standard Error (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
on Unionism with
in Compensation
in 1970 as Ad-
ditional Control
4. Coefficient and .03 .04 .03 .03 .02 .01




5. Coefficient and .02 .01 .01 .02 .008 .006
Standard Error on (.01) (.004) (.01) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Years Organized
with in Compensa-




and in Later Years
6. Number of 570 555 546 531 545 .517 609
Institutions
7.Coefficient and .12 .08 .08 .06 .09 .06 .04
Standard Error (.03) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01)
on Unionism in
Basic Regression
8. Coefficient and.10 .06 .08 .05 .05 .09 .03
Standard Errdr(.02) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01)
on Unionism with
in Compensation
in 1965 as Ad-
ditional Control
9. Coefficient and.04 .07 .08 .04 .04 .02 .02




10. Coefficient and.04 .06 .07 .03 .04 .02 .01
Standard Error on(.O1) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.004) (.003) (.003)
Years Organized
with in Compensa-.
tion in 1965 as.
Additional Control
/1—Allrcrcsgjons include fullftlvrib1c from Table 2.24
on th 0—i union dummy drops by just .01 to .02points, leaving a sizeable
estimated impact, while the coefficienton years organized barely falls.
There are two possible reasons for thesedisparate findings: 1. Since
the schools reporting compensation in 1965 and in1970 are somewhat different,
the difference could reflect differences in thesamples; 2. Since faculty
unionization increased rapidly in the 1970's,the result could reflect a
tendency for schools facing organizing drives or potentialorganizing drives
to raise pay with the hope of discouraging unionization.The possibility
that the differences are due to differencesin samples can be examined by
comparing the effects of adding In compensation in1965 and in copensatjon
in 1970 to regressions
covering the same sample of firms.The results of
such an analysis for two
years, 1976 and 1973, are given inTable 7, which
records coefficients andstandard errors on theunion dummy variable and onyears
organized, entered separately, in incompensation regressions. Column
(1) presents results withoutcontrolling for compensation in 1965 or 1970;
column (2) gives results with in of 1970compensation as the indicator of
omitted factors; while column (3)gives results with in of 1965 compensation
as the additional explanatory factor. Theregressions show clearly that dif-
ferences in the samples do notexplain the differential results: in thesame
set of schools, controlling for incompensation in 1970 reduces estimated
effects of unions by considerabiymore than controlling for in compensation
in 1965. This leavesopen the possibility that compensationmay have been
raised in schools about toorganize in the l970's.
A Full Sample Analysis
The evidence that unionism hasonly a modest effect on compensation
when in compensation in 1970 isentered as a control but a sizeable effect
when ln compensation in 1965 isentered leaves open the question of themag—25
Table 7 :Differential Impact of Adding in Compensation in 1970
and in Compensation in 1965
on the Estimated Effect of Unionism in 1976 and in 1973"-
Dependent Variable: in Compenation in 1976
Without
Controlling Controlling Controlling
for Initial for (in 1970 for (in 1965
Compensation Compensation)Compensation)
1. Coefficients and .033 .005 .027
Standard Errors (.012) (.011) (.011)
on Union Dummy Variable
2. Coefficients and .015 .008 .014
Standard Errors (.003) (.003) (.003)
on Years
Organized
3.Sample Size 550 550 550
Dependent Variable: in Compensation in 1973
4. Coefficients and .053 .014 .050
Standard Errors (.020) (.018) (.019)
on Union Dummy Variable
5. Coefficients and .034 .013 .032
Standard Errors (.011) (.009) (.010)
on Years
Organized
6. Sample Size 502 502 502
/1
All regressions include full set of control variables from Table 2.
Regressions in lines 1,4 employ the 0—1 union dummy variable as measure
of unionism and do not include years organized. Regressions in lines
2 and 5 use years organized as the measure of unionism and exclude the
0—1 dummy variable.26
nitude of the union impact. To obtain an overall estimate of the unioneffect
corrected for omitted establishment factors, it isnecessary to
pool the information on h1 from the full set of data over time. The easiest
way to do this is to assume that h1 has the same effect on in compensation
in each year and add individual school constants toregressions of in com-
pensation on the various control variables,
measures of unions, and time duzrznies.
Such an analysis permits maximum use of the available observations,since
all institutions that report to AAUPmore than once are included in the
calculations. The result of theregression is an estimate of the average
effect of unionism on in
compensation over the period, corrected for aconstant
institution effect. To theextent that h is not constantover time, the regres-
sions are likely to understate theunion effect, since on the basis ofthe cal-
culations in Table 6, Ais likely to be less than
Table 8 presents the results ofsuch a regression analysis on thesample
of iflstjtutjonsreporting at least twice in the AAUPsurvey over the period 1965,
1970—1977. Colis (1) and (3)give the coefficient on unionism andyears
organizedon in compensation without individual institutionconstants.
Columns(2) and(4)record results with individualconstants included as ex-
planatory variables.The final,two coluts present coefficientson the two
measures of unionism, entered together, with and withoutthe individual
constants. The analysis shows a significant effect of tradeunionism in all
cases, with years organized bearing a much stronger relation tocompensation
than the 0—1 duny variable,especially after addition of the school constants.
The coefficient on the union duumiy variabledrops by about 80 percent upon addition
of the constant (column 2 vs. column1), while the coefficient on yearsorganized
falls much more modestly. In columns(5) and (6) addition of the school constants
effectivelywipesout the impact of the union dt.mmiy variable but doesnot alter the
coefficientonyears organized substantially. As the estimates in the table27
Table 8
Estimates of the Effect of Unionism in
Faculty Compensation Using Pooled Sample
for 1965, 197076a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coefficients and
standard errors on
1. unionism .105 .023 .063 .005
(.004) (.004) (.006) (.004)
2. years organized .025 .013 .015 .013
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Other Controls
3. school character— / I I / / isticsb
4. region dummies (3) / I
5.year dummies (7) 1 1 / / /
6.school constants I / /
Summarystatistics
7. R .83 .96 .83 .96 .83 .96
8. N 8436 8436 8436 8436 8436 8436
aDependent variable is in compensation
bSchool characteristics,as in Table 2, in odd—numbered columns. The only characteristics
to which we have data regarding changes over time are the degree—granting status of
the. school andthedummy variable for this are included in the even—numbered regressions.28
are based on a sample with 7 years of experience from the 1970's aridjust
a single earlier year, the overall results are closer to those obtainedby
adding in compensation in 1970 to the regressions for individualyears than
to those obtained by adding in compensation in 1965. If institutions with
potential for organizing raised compensation in the 1970's, the overall
effect of faculty unions on compensation is likely to be understatedcompared
to results that would be obtained if we had additional data for the 1960's.
As they stand, the results do showa fairly substantial impact of years
organized on compensation, with institutions thatbecame union in, say,
1970, having compensation about 9percent higher than they would otherwise
have had. As noted earlier, however, the
linear years organized effect
should not be extrapolated beyond the limitsof the sample: presumably
the effect will decline asyears organized grows.
Conclusion
This paper has examined the effectsof faculty unionism onfaculty corn-.
pensation using differenttypes of models and found that the estimated
impact depends significantly on themodel. Cross—section calculationsyield
sizeable estimates of the effectof faculty unionism oncompensation, and on
fringe benefits,which, however, differ over time andamong institutions,
and which show a stronger impact for
years organized than for an 0—1 dummy
variable measure of unionism. Alongitudinal model, which allows for a link
between unionism and pre—union compensation levelsand fo a link between
unionism and the characteristics thataffect rates of change ofcompensation,
yielded divergent estimates: with 1970compensation entered in the regressions,
the union effect was substantiallyreduced; with 1965 compensation entered,
the effect remained sizeable. Ina fixed effect model using all of the
institutions and years, theaverage effect of years organized was significant29
and sizeable, but the effect of 0—1 union dummy variable declinedgreatly
from cross—section estimates. The different results obtained in different
years arid with different samples and models is consistent with the divergent
estimates of the effect of faculty unionism obtained in previouswork,
highlighting the need for more inclusive samples and estimating techniques.
Perhaps the most surpri3ing finding relates to the dependence of the
union effect on years organized. This finding could result fromthree possible
factors: 1. The increased ability of unions to wingains as time proceeds,
at least over the span considered here; 2. Earlyorganization of institutions
with greater potential for gains inwages (as opposed to initially higher wages);
3. Greater difficulty in obtaining increases by unionsorganizing in the l970s
weakened academic market place than by uni 1s organizing earlier. Ifthe
results reflect the first factor, there are obviously muchlarger economic
benefits from organization of remaining nonunioncampuses than if they reflect
the second or third factors.30
Footnotes
/1
These estimates relate to schools rather thancampuses.More than
500 campuses are reported as having bargainingagents. The figures on
faculty unionism given by Burton relate to campuses; those
given by the National Center of Education relate to schools.
/2
The National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining inHigher
Education lists 74 schools as having voted against unionismas of 1977
compared to 343 who choose unionism.
/3
Birnbaum analyzed a sample of 88 matched union and nonunioncampuses
and found sizeable union wage advantages in 1972 andgreater increases
in wages on unionized campuses from 1968 to 1972.Morgan and Kearney ana-
lyzed a sample of 46 paired 4—year institutions, also finding largermone-
tary gains for unionized institutions, in this case from 1969—79 to 1974—75.
Brown and Stone analyzed salary and compensationgrowth before and after
collective bargaining on 37 campuses from 1970—71 to 1975—76 andcompared
the rates to those in the nation. They found t'nosignificant impacts on
salary, compensation, and promotions associated with the adoption of col—
lective bargaining by college and universityfaculty."
/4
These categories are an amalgamation of those givenon pp. 68—72 of the
Education Commission of the States booklet. I havekept groups A, B and C
from chart A as groups 1, 2 and 3; categorized thestates from group C of
chart B as having anti—union legislation (group 5) andplaced the rest in
group 4.31
/5
These figures are based on calculations from thecomputer tapes on
representation elections of the NLRB.
/6
Since the public institutions differ in variousways from the private institutions,
these figure.s do not imply that public institutions are twiceas likely to
organize as private institutions.
/7
This fund is described in Finkin, Goldstein, & Osborne, pp. 72—7
The purpose of an inequity fund is "to raise the base salaries of those
faculty members who fall below an established norm" (p. 72). For details
see Collective Bargaining Agreement By and Between the Administration of
Adelphi University and Adeiphi University Chapter, American Association
of University Professors, Sept. 1,1973, Appendix B.
/8
In particular, the percentage of schools unionized in the sample
agrees well with the percentage reported for all schools.
'9
In several calculations, the dummy variable for schools unionized
after the base year obtained negative coefficients, indicating that
the newly organized schools were obtaining lower compensation than nonunion schools.
/10
When X is less than 1, forcing it to be 1 will overstate the effect
of the fixed factor, biasing downward the coefficient on the union variable.References
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